Protecting the Press by Protecting the Journalist: A Wrongful Discharge Action for Editorial Employees at Newspapers by Baker, Randy
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 8 | Number 1 Article 1
1-1-1985
Protecting the Press by Protecting the Journalist: A
Wrongful Discharge Action for Editorial
Employees at Newspapers
Randy Baker
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Randy Baker, Protecting the Press by Protecting the Journalist: A Wrongful Discharge Action for Editorial Employees at Newspapers, 8
Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1 (1985).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol8/iss1/1
Protecting the Press by Protecting the
Journalist: A Wrongful Discharge




Guaranteeing freedom of the press is a central premise of the
American system of government and perhaps of any system of
government in which sovereignty rests with the citizens rather
than the state. The reason press freedom is of such significance
is that the press, as an institution, is uniquely suited to provide
the public with an uninterrupted flow of information about
politics and society, and thereby to "check" the government.'
While the principal threat to this flow of information previ-
ously came from the government, today it comes from the own-
ers of the news media themselves.2 Specifically, the owners of
newspapers--arguably the most important medium from the
standpoint of the checking functionq-have been known to use
their power over their editorial employees to prevent the publi-
cation of certain information and viewpoints.4 Thus, even ab-
sent significant state interference, press coverage has been
curtailed across a wide spectrum of issues ranging from the
purposes of the United States nuclear weapons program to the
nature of environmental hazards.5
Broadly speaking, newspaper owners suppress news in order
* B.A., Reed College, 1979; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1984. The
author is a doctoral student in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.
The author wishes to thank Robert Post for his trenchant criticism of earlier versions
of this proposal, and Frank Lalle for helpful comments on the final draft.
1. See, e.g., Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L. J. 631 (1975).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 31-101.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 56-115.
5. See, e.g., Manoff, Covering the Bomb: Press and: State in the Shadow of Nu-
clear War (prepared for the Conference on War, Peace and the News Media organized
by the Journalism Department, New York University, March 18-19, 1983); Smith,
Covering the EPA, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 29.
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to safeguard the prevailing distribution of political power.' In
addition, they suppress information to protect an increasingly
broad range of commercial interests.7 The editorial staffs of
newspapers, however, do not share their employers' interests in
suppressing news. Staff members not only lack the outside
commercial interests of their employers, but their professional
identity creates a strong motivation for journalists to publish
the results of their investigations.8 Consequently, newspaper
owners employ a number of methods to overcome a general dis-
inclination by their staffs to suppress information.9 The power
to discharge a recalcitrant employee is among the most impor-
tant of these devices.
10
If newspaper companies were barred from discharging edito-
rial employees for the purpose of suppressing information, it is
likely that the companies' suppression efforts would be less
successful." As a result, the public would receive a more di-
verse and informative flow of news and the principal objective
of a free press would be promoted.
Newspaper editors and reporters could be protected from
such discharges by expanding California's common law prohibi-
tion against discharges motivated by purposes contrary to pub-
lic policy. This law already protects employees who have been
discharged for a wide variety of reasons, from complaining
about unhealthy workplace conditions 2 to refusing to partici-
pate in illegal price-fixing activities.'3 Such discharges have
been held to contravene the public policies expressed in Cali-
fornia's occupational health and safety statutes' 4 and antitrust
laws,' 5 respectively. The courts found that the purposes behind
these statutes would be thwarted if employers could use their
discharge power in these contexts.
An even greater violation of public policy, as expressed in the
6. See, e.g., B. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1983).
7. Id.
8. See Dreier, Newsroom Democracy and the Media Monopoly, 2 & 3 INSURGENT
SOCIOLOGIST 70, 76-77 (1978).
9. See Breed, Social Control in the Newsroom, 33 SOCIAL FORCES 326 (1955).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 102-21.
11. Id.
12. See Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
13. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980).
14. Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 164.




free press clauses of the United States"6 and California17 consti-
tutions, is committed when the power to discharge an employee
is used to obstruct the flow of information through the press.
To prevent such violations, editorial employees at newspapers
should be able to bring wrongful discharge actions against their
employers whenever they are discharged in order to suppress
the publication of certain information in the newspaper. Such
a rule would neither interfere with the editorial autonomy of
newspapers nor encroach on the free speech rights of owners.
Rather, the proposed measure represents a non-intrusive, yet
effective, method of enhancing the vigor of journalism and,
therefore, the vigor of our democratic system of government.
The Checking Function
United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart has
pointed out that the press is the only business to receive ex-
plicit constitutional protection." This special protection re-
flects the central political assumption underlying the American
system of government: the principal threat to liberty is the ten-
dency of governments to usurp the sovereignty of their citi-
zens.19 The corollary of this maxim is that popular sovereignty
can be preserved only by keeping governmental action under
continuous public scrutiny. 20
The press is uniquely suited to this task: it secures the work
of skilled writers, analysts and investigators and provides these
people with the resources needed to execute their tasks. It also
acts as an apparatus to distribute their work to the public. In
short, the press is an institution oriented toward the dissemina-
tion of articulate and well-formed reports and reflections on
matters of public concern. This is precisely what is required to
insure that the government remains accountable to its
citizens.21
In fact, during the 18th century, reports and polemics in the
press played an important role in inciting public sentiment in
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
18. Stewart, supra note 1, at 633.
19. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969).
20. Blasi, The Checking Value of the First Amendment, 3 AM. BAR FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 521, 541 (1977).
21. See Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 819, 828-36 (1980).
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the colonies against the British government.22 The protection
accorded the press by the first amendment reflected public con-
cern that the press retain the capacity to incite an opposition by
providing the public with an unrestricted flow of information
and criticism.23 Thus, the freedom of the press has a structural
role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of
self-government. 24 It is the component of civil society whose
"governmental" function is to check the state.25
To execute its checking function today, the press must cover
a much broader range of activities and institutions than was
necessary when constitutional protection was first afforded the
press in the 18th century. Since the government now inter-
venes in the full range of economic activities, from labor-man-
agement relations to planning technological development,2 6
scrutinizing the government entails reporting on virtually the
entire range of American commerce and industry. Thus, the
press must closely examine the activities of institutions gener-
ally considered to be in the private sphere, such as corporations
and labor unions, if governmental interaction with these insti-
tutions is to remain subject to the check of an informed public.
Perhaps the most important news medium from the stand-
point of the checking function is the daily newspaper. To-
gether with television, newspapers constitute the public's
principal source of information and news.2 ' However, newspa-
pers strongly influence the selecton and treatment of stories by
television news. 28 And, newspapers are better suited than tele-
vision to present information which is attractive to only a lim-
ited audience; articles with limited appeal are less likely to
cause readers to switch newspapers than broadcasts are likely
to cause viewers to change channels.29 Since the political, social
and economic discussion of greatest significance to the checking
function is, by its nature, partisan and controversial, this factor
substantially increases the relative importance of newspapers.
22. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 463 (1983).
23. Id. at 468-70.
24. Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1979).
25. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 634.
26. See, e.g., J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
27. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM & TV Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d
339, 344-46 (1970), cited in FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 783 (1978).
28. E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 30, 37 (1973).
29. See D. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 76-77 (1984).
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Finally, the editorial content of newspapers is not subject to
government regulation.3 0  Therefore, if the press is to effec-
tively check the government, newspapers must play a central
role.
The Impairment of the Checking Function
Unfortunately, newspapers fail to perform their checking
function with adequate vigor or regularity. They fail chiefly
because they tend to limit or suppress the publication of infor-
mation which is incompatible with the interests and ideologies
of corporate leaders.3 1 As a result, newspapers have failed to
report important information regarding government manage-
ment of foreign affairs,32 police abuse of dissidents,3 the Cold
War,34 and the United States nuclear weapons program. 5 The
list could be extended to include almost every major policy
question facing the American public. 6 Part of the problem
may be attributed to weaknesses in the journalistic norm of ob-
jectivity,37 the relatively conservative middle class background
of most journalists,38 or the tendency of journalists to identify
30. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). See F.W.
FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 132-133
(1976) (presents graphic evidence that the current method of regulating broadcasting
affords the government substantial leverage over broadcasters). See also Bollinger,
Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the
Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976) (discusses strengths and weaknesses of regu-
lated broadcast journalism and of unregulated print journalism).
31. See B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6; J. ARONSON, DEADLINE FOR THE MEDIA
(1972).
32. See, e.g., Morris, Through the Looking Glass in Chile: Coverage of Allende's
Regime, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 15; Dorman and Omeed, Report-
ing Iran the Shah's Way, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 27; Friedman,
Eyes Right, THE QUILL, Jan. 1985, at 10. Each of the articles shows that the major
organs of the American press, on the whole, closely followed U.S. government inter-
pretations of events in Chile, Iran and Central America respectively, even though the
government interpretations were, in each case, extremely dubious.
33. See, e.g., R. GOTTLIEB & I. WOLF, THINKING BIG 394-95 (1977); Dreier, supra
note 8.
34. J. ARONSON, THE PRESS AND THE COLD WAR (1970).
35. See Manoff, supra note 5 (demonstrates that the major news media stopped
debating the appropriateness of developing a nuclear arsenal after World War II once
the Truman Administration decided to build one); Morris, Reporting for Duty: The
Pentagon and the Press, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 27 (documents
the uncritical acceptance by major organs of the press of government information and
rationales for an arms build-up which were, in fact, quite inaccurate).
36. See B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6.
37. See M. SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS (1978).
38. See Dreier, supra note 8, at 73.
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with their sources3 9 or to lose track of the meaning of events by
overemphasizing details.4 °
Another, and perhaps the principal reason that critical ac-
counts41 are underrepresented in newspapers is that newspaper
owners, for a variety of reasons, generally do not wish them to
be published and are usually in a position to insure that their
preferences are respected.42 The power of newspaper firms to
exert this sort of control is due, in part, to the relatively weak
market position of newspaper readers. As a result of a trend
toward failure and merger in the newspaper industry, which
accelerated after World War II, most newspaper firms today op-
erate in markets with little or no competition.43 While there
are about 1,500 daily papers in the United States, the vast ma-
jority publish in markets without a competing daily.44 Only
thirty cities have competing daily newspapers; an additional
twenty-three cities have two dailies which have separate edito-
rial staffs, but otherwise share profits.45 Only three cities have
more than two dailies. 46 Thus, newspaper readers have a very
limited opportunity to influence newspaper content through
their consumption decisions, because concentrated markets of
this kind do not faithfully translate consumer preferences into
producer decisions.47
This loss of reader control is exacerbated by the rising impor-
tance of advertising revenues. Readers now account for only
twenty-five percent of newspaper revenues: advertisers pro-
vide the other seventy-five percent of their revenues. 48 Thus,
readers are no longer the major customers. Instead, they have
become merely a factor of production. The principal customers
are now the advertisers.
The chief concern of advertisers is to obtain consuming audi-
39. Id. at 73-74.
40. Breed, supra note 9, at 331 n.17.
41. I will use the term "critical accounts" to refer to reports which contain infor-
mation that is inconsistent with the newspaper owner's world view.
42. The central factors here are their control over the editorial staff and their
relative freedom from market constraints due to limited competition in the industry.
43. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 120-26.
44. B. COMPAINE, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA 36 (1982).
45. Id. at 36-37.
46. Id.
47. R.G. LIPSEY & P.O. STEINER, ECONOMICS 344-47 (1969).
48. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 117. This fact explains, in part, how it has been
possible for profits in the newspaper industry to grow while circulation has declined.
See Id. at 197-198.
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ences. Such audiences are attracted to newspapers for a wide
variety of reasons: sports, features, reviews, advertisements
and news. As long as the relevant audience is retained, it is
probably of little interest to advertisers when a newspaper
shifts its emphasis to the non-news interests of its readership.
However, advertisers are not entirely indifferent to a news-
paper's content. They have an interest in minimizing the dis-
semination of information that reflects negatively on
themselves or on their product and often seek to influence pub-
lic opinion and, thereby, public policy.49 Therefore, advertisers
are also concerned with minimizing the publication of material
which is incompatible with their public policy objectives.
In fact, newspapers do limit their coverage of many issues in
order to protect the interests of their advertisers. The extent of
this limitation is not easily ascertained because newspapers go
to great lengths to depict their editorial decisions as fair and
impartial, and based on journalistic rather than commercial cri-
teria.5 o One fairly obvious way this is done is by presenting ad-
vertisers' perspectives on stories as if they were independent
accounts containing material not intended to promote a partic-
ular perspective. This is accomplished by printing articles
based almost exclusively on advertisers' press releases with lit-
tle or no further investigation.5 1 In addition, there are in-
stances in which newspaper firms directly intervene in the
editorial process to suppress information unfavorable to an ad-
vertiser. 2 More broadly, newspapers apply different editorial
standards to information which touches on the interests of
their advertisers. As former Washington Post editor Ben
Bagdikian put it, "[n]ews that might damage an advertiser gen-
49. See, e.g., I. KRISTOL, Two CHEERS FOR CAPITALISM (1978). A central theme of
these essays is the need for large corporations to engage in more systematic efforts to
influence the overall shape of ideology and political discourse in a pro-corporate direc-
tion. Kristol's approach is very popular with America's major corporations. They
have directed substantial resources toward the goal of persuading and/or coercing the
major news media to portray America's large corporations in a favorable light. See
Dreier, The Corporate Complaint Against the Media, THE QUILL, Nov. 1983, at 17.
50. Cf B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 223-24 (declaring that the ethic of objectiv-
ity and fairness, though not always followed, is "a helpful shield from gross subver-
sion of the news.").
51. Id. at 166-67.
52. For example, the discharge of the editor of The Flint Journal was caused, in
part, by his publication of an article about an auto brokerage whose prices were lower
than the auto dealers which advertised regularly in the paper. Moore, How to Keep
'em, Happy in Flint, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 42.
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erally must pass a higher threshold of drama and documenta-
tion than other kinds of news. 53
The fact that newspaper owners and publishers are increas-
ingly involved in an extensive variety of non-newspaper enter-
prises also contributes to the suppression of news. Today, it is
common for newspapers to be owned by firms which are in-
volved in diverse areas of commerce such as banking or real
estate. The Hearst Corporation, for example, has extensive
real estate holdings in San Francisco, the site of one of its pa-
pers. 4 Furthermore, the boards of directors of firms owning
newspapers frequently include individuals who also sit as direc-
tors of other major corporations.5
As with advertisers, the interests of enterprises affiliated
with newspaper owners have influenced editorial policy. The
Baltimore Sun suppressed a story about labor negotiations at a
hospital whose board of directors included a member of the
Sun's board. 6 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times discharged a
reporter for writing a critical review of an urban development
project which might have increased the value of the Times' real
estate holdings. 7
Similarly, when reporters at both the San Francisco Chroni-
cle and the Los Angeles Times presented stories which sug-
gested misconduct in a transaction between one of their large
advertisers and the U.C.L.A. chancellor (also a Times board
member), the accounts were drastically rewritten so that mis-
conduct was no longer implied.5 8 Following the publication of
reports in the Du Pont-controlled Wilmington, Delaware
Newspapers which documented special treatment of the Du
Pont Corporation by the Delaware tax assessor, the newspaper
board chairman, who was also a board member and former ex-
53. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 166.
54. Redmond, Up Against the Media Monopoly, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN,
Oct. 10, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
55. Dreier & Weinberg, Interlocking Directorates, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 51. For example, the Gannett Corporation, which had the second
largest newspaper circulation nationally, shared board members with Merrill Lynch
(stockbrokers), Standard Oil of Ohio (oil), 20th Century-Fox (films), Kerr-McGee (oil,
gas, nuclear power, aerospace), McDonnell Douglas Aircraft (military and civilian air-
craft), McGraw-Hill (book publishers), Phillips Petroleum, Kellogg Company (cere-
als), and New York Telephone Company. Id. at 53-55.
56. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 3 (citing COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Spring
1970, at 5).
57. R. GOrrLIEB & I. WOLF, supra note 33, at 472-73.
58. Id. at 388-89.
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ecutive of Du Pont, sent a memorandum to an executive editor
ordering that "[n]o more resources will be made available for
reflective or investigative reporting."59 When, subsequent to
the memo, another investigative story appeared, this time ex-
amining the previously secret finances of the University of Del-
aware, which was closely connected to the Du Pont family, the
paper's board demanded the resignations of two editors.6 °
Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether newspapers
suppress news to protect outside economic interests or to pro-
mote broader ideological objectives.6 1 One such instance took
place at the Cleveland Plain Dealer in the late 1970's. The City
of Cleveland was split at that time by a heated controversy over
a referendum which would authorize Cleveland to sell its pub-
licly-owned electric company to a privately-owned firm in or-
der to resolve the city's financial crisis.62 The mayor opposed
the sale while the private electric company and the city's larg-
est creditor, a local bank, strongly supported it. 3 At one time,
the same man was chairman of the board of the bank and the
Plain Dealer. Although this direct link had been severed
before the issue emerged, the Plain Dealer contributed $18,000
to a business lobbying group which had actively opposed the
mayor on numerous issues, including the sale of the electric
company.64
The paper's coverage of the issue had been so tremendously
slanted toward the sale that it printed a number of flagrantly
inaccurate reports on the matter.6 5 During the month preced-
ing the referendum, the reporter who had written the paper's
first piece criticizing the sale was pulled from the story.66 Con-
vinced that his reassignment was a response to pressure from
59. Arnett, Family Affair, MORE, Feb. 1975, at 3.
60. Id.
61. Since corporations and their chief officers and directors frequently participate
in civic organizations such as chambers of commerce which have a distinctive interest
group-lobbying side, one can not easily distinguish those acts and affiliations which
reflect intellectual or political values from those which reflect the enlightened pur-
suit of commercial gain.
62. Freilich, Cleveland 'Plain Dealer,' Pressured by Reporters, Prints a Story It
Stifled, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 1979, at 49.
63. Id. at 49-50.
64. Id. at 51.
65. Id. at 54.
66. Id. at 56. The article documented substantial directorial involvement between




the private utility, the newspaper staff proceeded to set up an
informational picket around the Plain Dealer to publicize their
concern that the paper's publisher was suppressing information
detrimental to the private utility's position.
Following the picket, the national media attention it at-
tracted, and the resignation of a reporter in protest of the sup-
pression of his stories on the utility issue, the Plain Dealer
printed a series of articles documenting numerous facts which
were quite unfavorable to those advocating the sale. For ex-
ample, the series presented evidence that the private utility, in
violation of antitrust laws, had been trying to eliminate compe-
tition from the public utility for two decades.68 Many observers
believed that the subsequent voter disapproval of the sale was a
direct consequence of the series. 9
Journalists covering the 1968 Democratic convention in Chi-
cago for Chicago's newspapers experienced even more brazen
suppression of their reports. Their eyewitness accounts of ram-
pant police violence 70 against peace demonstrators were rewrit-
ten to suggest that either the demonstrators were committing
the violent acts or that the violent acts by the police were "nec-
essary. ' 71 Reports of unprovoked police violence have also
been suppressed at the Los Angeles Times.72
The suppression of critical information is not limited to
newspapers reputed to be politically conservative or moderate.
When New York Times reporter Raymond Bonner sent back a
story from El Salvador asserting that the 1982 United States-
sponsored elections there would not resolve anything because
the left couldn't participate, his story was rewritten and pub-
lished under the title, "For the Left, Big Setback. ' 73 The ac-
companying article was "not at all the story" Bonner wrote.74
Perhaps the most blatant publicly reported breach by a news-
paper of its constitutional responsibility to inform the public
67. Id. at 56-57.
68. Id. at 57.
69. Id.
70. Dreier, supra note 8, at 78. In a report submitted by Dan Walker (who later
was elected governor of Illinois) to the National Commission on the Causes and Pre-
vention of Violence 1(1968), police behavior at the convention was said to have in-
cluded "unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence."
71. Id.
72. R. GOrrLIEB & I. WOLF, supra note 33, at 394-95.
73. Bonner, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1982, at 1.
74. Interview with Raymond Bonner, in San Francisco (Oct. 31, 1984).
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occurred when a Chicago newspaper gained access to illegally
compiled Chicago police files which recorded the political activ-
ities of local dissidents. Instead of publishing a report on the
existence of these files, the newspaper used them to screen its
own reporters.75
While overt acts of suppression such as those described above
are not uncommon, the suppression of critical accounts usually
does not involve direct intervention by the journalist's em-
ployer. Instead, critical accounts are kept out of newspapers
through the implementation of "policy.
7 6
How Policy Impairs the Checking Function
Policy expresses the owner's bias; it is a set of rules incorpo-
rated into the editorial process to yield accounts which are con-
sistent with the owners' ideologies and interests. The principal
agent for the execution of policy is the editor, since it is the
editor who sets the tone of the paper and supervises its daily
operations.77 Consequently, the selection of an editor entails
not only a review of the candidate's credentials as a journalist
and manager, but also the compatibility of her world view with
that of the owner and the likelihood that she would loyally in-
corporate the owner's interests into the editorial process.78
The job of enforcing policy, however, is a source of tension
for the editor. As a professional journalist, the editor is bound
by standards which may be entirely inconsistent with the en-
forcement of privately or commercially influenced policy. For
example, Part III, Section I of the "Canons of Journalism"
states that the "promotion of any private interest contrary to
the general welfare, for whatever reason, is not compatible
with honest journalism. '79 Yet the execution of policy is, in
large part, precisely the subordination of the public's interest in
an unrestricted flow of information to the employer's private
interest in limiting that flow. Professional standards notwith-
75. J. ARONSON, supra note 34, at 53.
76. See Breed, supra note 9, at 327. I am taking the term "policy" from Breed,
though my usage may differ slightly from his. In this discussion, policy will refer to
the insertion of non-journalistic criteria into the editorial process in order to accomo-
date the non-journalistic, e.g. commercial, interests of the newspaper corporations.
77. Id. at 334.
78. Interview with Prof. Ben Bagdikian, School of Journalism, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, in Berkeley (Nov. 28, 1984).
79. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS, 624
(W. Schramm ed. 1960).
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standing, if the editor does not execute policy, she will be dis-
charged or pressured into resigning."s
The covert nature of policy creates another problem for the
editor: she must communicate it to her staff. The administra-
tion of policy requires cooperation from the editorial staff.
Otherwise, the staff would tend to write stories which the edi-
tor could not publish.81 Yet, the editor is not at liberty simply
to publish the rules of policy since, as a matter of record, they
do not exist.
As a result, policy is generally conveyed to reporters indi-
rectly. Journalists learn it by reading the paper itself, hearing
what types of stories are valued by editors and senior staffers
and which are not, observing the parts of their own stories that
are deleted, and noting the attitudes expressed by editors dur-
ing discussions concerning the angles to be stressed in ap-
proaching various stories.82 The reporter adheres to policy
because his prospects for occupational mobility, recognition by
colleagues and new professional challenges depend on it.83 In
addition, a reporter is reminded by the discharges of other re-
porters and editors that stem from violation of policy that even
his job can be jeopardized by violating policy.84 Therefore, staff
members, like editors, must also compromise their allegiance to
professional norms.
This subordination of professional allegiance to organiza-
tional imperative is not, however, the result of a single decision.
There is an ongoing process of negotiation between reporters
and editors and between editors and employers over the valid-
ity of policy in particular contexts. For example, reporters
with star status or unusually comprehensive knowledge about
80. Interview with Prof. Bagdikian, supra note 78. A survey of editors employed
by newspaper chains (the majority of American newspaper editors are so employed)
reported that 1/3 of them admitted they would be reluctant to run a story that was
damaging to their employer's interests. Ethics Committee, American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Special Report: News and Editorial Independence. A Survey of
Group and Independent Editors, (April 1980), cited in B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at
32. In the case of the larger chains, twenty of which account for 50% of the daily
newspaper circulation in the United States, this admitted reluctance covers quite a bit
of subject matter. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60. Furthermore, the actual
proportion of editors employed by chains who would be reluctant to print such stories
is almost certainly higher than the proportion who would acknowledge it. See L.
FESTINGER, THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
81. See Breed, supra note 9, at 326-27.
82. Id. at 328-29.
83. Id. at 330.
84. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 39.
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issues of which the news executives are ignorant may be able to
publish material that otherwise would be excluded because of
policy.
8 5
During the 1960's and early 1970's, this negotiation process
became more heated as reporters began to insist on adherence
to professional norms with increasing vigor and frequency. 6
At its height, this conflict developed into a national movement
for "newsroom democracy. '8 7 Two of the key manifestations of
newsroom democracy were the formation of newsroom
caucuses to secure greater autonomy for reporters and the
proliferation of journalism reviews staffed chiefly by newspa-
per journalists.8 8 The caucuses sought, and occasionally won,
concessions such as the right of journalists to analyze informa-
tion rather than simply repeat what their sources said. The
journalism reviews provided a medium through which journal-
ists could publish information that their newspapers had sup-
pressed.9 In addition, they served as a forum in which
journalists could criticize the news media's performance, their
deviation from professional standards, and occasionally even
the standards themselves. 90
Two of the central causes of the newsroom democracy move-
ment were the greater level of professional education which
these journalists had attained compared to their predecessors
and the fact that many of the chief news sources during this
period came from movements that were critical of American
society.91 The higher level of professional education caused
journalists to identify more strongly with journalism as a pro-
85. Breed, supra note 9, at 334.
86. Dreier, supra note 8, at 77-80.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 77-80; see also J. ARONSON, DEADLINE FOR THE MEDIA (1972). Aronson
systematically examines a number of the problems with which proponents of news-
room democracy were concerned and also discusses the scope and range of the move-
ment at its height.
89. Id. at 78-79. Among the stories which appeared in the Chicago Journalism
Review was one which showed that Black Panther Party (a radical black nationalist-
civil rights group) leader, Fred Hampton, was killed, not as the Chicago Police
claimed, in self defense or by accident, but rather as a result of police and government
misconduct ranging somewhere between reckless disregard for life and conspiracy.
This analysis was corroborated in a report by the Commission of Inquiry into the
Black Panthers and the Police, chaired by Roy Wilkins and Ramsey Clark and pub-
lished as Search and Destroy (1973).
90. See, e.g., Dorfman, Toward a Non-capitalist Journalism, CHI. JOURNALISM
REV., Dec. 1970, at 7.
91. Dreier, supra note 8, at 76-77.
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fession and with its professional norms. This had the effect of
emphasizing the .inconsistency between the journalists' organi-
zational obligation to follow policy and their professional duty
to publish "without fear or favor.
92
The fact that journalists were more frequently covering dissi-
dent sources meant that the normal process of a journalist
identifying with a source was in flux. Traditionally, sources
had been, or represented, government officials or those in
power. Identification with such sources usually posed no spe-
cial problems, since policy tends to parallel the views of those
holding economic or political power. " However, the fact that
some journalists began to identify with the critics of those hold-
ing power meant that as journalists were developing growing
expectations of professional autonomy, many of them were
finding their expectations thwarted, since their accounts were
often informed by and based on dissident views incompatible
with policy.
94
By the mid 1970's, most of the journalism reviews and news-
room caucuses had folded and the level of conflict between
journalists and their employers had diminished substantially.9 5
A number of factors account for this decline. First, the major
metropolitan newspapers, where the movement had been
strongest, increased the level of autonomy accorded to editorial
employees. For example, today newspapers frequently permit
journalists to analyze events rather than simply recount what
are purported to be "objective facts."96 Second, labor market
conditions became increasingly unfavorable to journalists, fur-
ther weakening their already limited bargaining power. Third,
as the movements of the sixties lost their force and following,
their influence on the perceptions of journalists also dimin-
ished. Finally, the leaders of the newsroom democracy move-
ment frequently abandoned, or occasionally were removed
from, journalism.9
While the newsroom democracy movement achieved only
limited success, its history shows that newspapers would pres-
ent a more diverse range of information and analysis if their
92. Id. at 76.
93. Id. at 77.
94. Id. at 77-80.
95. Id. at 81.
96. See id. at 84.
97. Id. at 81-83.
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editorial decisions were more directly controlled by their pro-
fessional staffs. This conclusion derives further support from
comparing the interests of owners and journalists as they relate
to the following three factors which apparently motivate own-
ers to impose policy on their employees: advertising, non-jour-
nalistic business interests, and strong identification with the
status quo.
Insofar as newspaper firms are in business to maximize prof-
its, they have an interest in discouraging the publication of ma-
terial which might cause an advertiser to withdraw its
patronage. Each withdrawal adversely affects the paper's prof-
itability unless a replacement can be found which will provide
even more revenue than the original ad." Journalists, on the
other hand, do not have an interest in profits or, therefore, in
averting losses which might be caused by offending the inter-
ests of advertisers. The withdrawal of an advertiser is of con-
cern to the journalist only to the extent that it threatens his
salary, his benefits, or the prestige and viability of the
newspaper.
The contrast is even clearer when one compares the perti-
nence of non-newspaper business interests of the journalist to
those of the owner. Newspaper firms almost invariably have
outside, and frequently extensive, business interests,99 but jour-
nalists rarely have such conglomerate-like business interests.
Finally, the values and perceptions of journalists are strongly
influenced by the sources they cover.' ° The diverse points of
view held by individual sources work their way into and are
expressed in a journalist's reports. Owners, in contrast, do not
undergo this identification process. Instead, their ideology
tends to be somewhat uniform and reflects the limited social
stratum that participates in newspaper ownership.1°1
In sum, the evidence strongly suggests that much of the in-
formation which newspapers currently suppress would be pub-
lished if the power of journalists in the editorial process was
increased relative to that of owners. This would allow the pub-
lic greater access to the facts and opinions offered by those out
of power. Greater exposure to diverse and critical information
on topics such as U.S. foreign policy, proposed municipal fi-
98. This is the result of added transaction costs.
99. B. COMPAINE, supra note 44, at 452-63.
100. Dreier, supra note 8, at 77.
101. See B. COMPAINE, supra, note 44, at 452-63.
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nance schemes, and the circumvention of federal labor rela-
tions policy by large U.S. automakers would enhance the vigor
of the check which the press imposes on the government.
A Wrongful Discharge Remedy
One way to increase the autonomy of professional staffs
would be to strengthen their negotiating power in the editorial
decisionmaking process. This could be accomplished by accord-
ing editors and reporters who are discharged for writing or
publishing material a cause of action for wrongful discharge.
Newspaper firms would be placed under an obligation to re-
frain from using their power of discharge for the purpose of
suppressing information. Recovery would be allowed where
the plaintiff could demonstrate that the employer's purpose in
discharging him was 1) to prevent or punish him for writing or
publishing information which the employer wished to conceal
or 2) to deter other employees from writing or publishing such
information.
The employer would prevail, just as it would in other wrong-
ful discharge actions, by demonstrating that the termination
was for just cause.10 2 Consequently, where the employer could
show that the discharge was for tardiness, failing to do assign-
ments, criminal activity, incompetence, et cetera, it would pre-
vail. Since newspaper owners already contend that personnel
decisions are not made to suppress information, such a cause of
action could not be said to encroach on a sphere of legitimate
managerial discretion.103
This contention notwithstanding, such a cause of action
would deprive newspapers of an important mechanism with
which to enforce policy. Professor Bagdikian contends that edi-
tors and reporters are discharged every year precisely because
they write or publish information which displeases their em-
ployers.'0 4 One such incident involved the firing of a reporter
for writing, and the forced resignation of an editor for publish-
ing, a story about a local bank that angered the bank's chair-
102. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In Green, the
court, in a case under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, stated that the defendant
would prevail in an employment discrimination action where it could articulate a le-
gitimate non-discriminatory reason for its personnel decision which the plaintiff could
not then show to be merely pretextual. Id. at 802-04.
103. Cf B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 223-24.
104. Id. at 38-39.
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man.' ° In another case, a Chicago newspaper dismissed a
reporter for publicly exposing material that his newspaper had
suppressed.10 6 The Los Angeles Times dismissed an award-win-
ning urban affairs reporter for writing too critically of activities
associated with his employer's outside business interests.'07 A
similar fate befell two editors who allowed a reporter on a Wil-
mington, Delaware newspaper to write about public institu-
tions associated with the interests of that paper's owners.
0 8
The editor of The lint Journal was eventually asked to resign
after publishing investigative reports about General Motors
which disclosed, among other things, that management at a
Chevrolet plant violated its collective bargaining agreement
with the United Auto Workers by using a secret button to
speed up the assembly line. The paper's publisher was deeply
and publicly associated with General Motors.'
The covert nature of policy makes resignation the employer's
preferred method of termination in such circumstances. Dis-
cretion about the underlying purposes in such cases is also in
the discharged employee's interest.110 When a journalist is dis-
charged for refusing to conform to policy, it is extraordinarily
difficult for him to find employment with another newspaper,
as he becomes labeled a "troublemaker.""' Thus, many in-
stances of the use of discharge power to suppress news are con-
cealed behind the subterfuge of resignation.
However, the most important effect of such discharges is not
their impact on the journalists who are discharged. They are
more important as a warning to other journalists." 2 Only fif-
teen percent of the reporters employed by newspapers in the
United States are protected by collective bargaining agree-
ments. Virtually none of the upper level editors have such
protection.1
13
In his article arguing for a wrongful discharge action for all
105. Id. Usually, if a serious conflict develops between the editor and her em-
ployer, the editor will resign to avoid the stigma of being fired. Bagdikian, supra note
78.
106. Dreier, supra note 8, at 78-79.
107. R. GOrrLIEB & I. WOLF, supra note 33, at 472-73.
108. Arnett, supra note 59, at 3.
109. Moore, supra note 52, at 42.
110. Bagdikian, supra note 78.
111. Id.
112. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 38-39.
113. Telephone interview with David Eisen, Research Director of the Newspaper
Guild, Wash., D.C. (Dec. 6, 1984).
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employees who are dismissed without just cause, Professor
Blades claims that, above all else, the fear of discharge renders
an employee most vulnerable to employer coercion.114 The
threat of discharge may be a particularly effective method of
enforcing policy since it may cause a reporter's piece to be al-
tered or withheld when either editors or reporters fear dis-
charge. In addition, the reporter may be affected if she fears
punishment in some other manner by an editor who himself
fears discharge.
The sensitivity of reporters to sanctions arising from
breaches of policy was recently demonstrated by American re-
porters covering Central America. Shortly after the New York
Times withdrew its Central America correspondent, most
American correspondents reduced their presentation of mate-
rial critical of the United States government's policy in the re-
gion. This change occurred because it appeared that the Times
reporter had been reassigned because his reports had been too
critical. 15 In this context, it is worth noting that the proposed
wrongful discharge action may also deter employers from using
the following devices for suppressing information: 1) refusing
to print a story which contravenes policy; 2) rewriting a story to
conform to policy; or 3) transferring a correspondent to a less
desirable assignment. Such acts could strengthen the case of
that employee or of another in some future wrongful discharge
action." 6 Finally, a wrongful discharge action may protect re-
porters from editors who would use these sanctions to suppress
critical accounts on behalf of their own interests or ideologies.
A wrongful discharge action of the sort described would sub-
stantially raise the costs of policy to newspapers. To the extent
that they are profit maximizers, newspaper owners would be
compelled to concede more autonomy to their professional
staffs. Firms might attempt to respond to the increased costs
which the proposal would bring to news suppression by hiring
journalists who were less attached to professional norms and
especially loyal to their employer. However, there are two rea-
sons why this approach probably would not be very successful.
114. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1406 (1967).
115. Interview with Dan Hallin, Professor of Political Science and Communica-
tions of the University of California at San Diego, in San Francisco (Jan.18, 1986). See
Massing, About-Face on El Salvador, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 42.
116. Blades, supra note 114, at 1414.
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First, employers already screen journalists and editors in par-
ticular for loyalty. 117 But predicting human behavior is ex-
tremely difficult and the process is not always reliable. Even
the prospective employee may not know what she would do if
her professional obligations stood in direct opposition to the
preferences or policy of her employer.
Second, even a newspaper operating in a monopolistic mar-
ket is not entirely free of reader preferences. 118 Although the
monopolistic or near monopolistic market does allow newspa-
pers to sell a lower quality product and therefore to hire less
qualified journalists, newspapers in non-competitive markets
have already availed themselves of this opportunity. 19 To alter
their hiring criteria further, they would be forced to deviate
from the optimal mix of loyalty and competence which, accord-
ing to neoclassical economic theory, now informs their person-
nel decisions. 2 °
This would create two serious risks for the newspaper. First,
readers who had purchased the newspaper in reliance on the
quality of its journalism may no longer find it worth purchas-
ing. Instead, they might substitute magazines, out-of-town
newspapers, or other media as sources of news. Second, this
group of disaffected readers might create a sufficient base to
permit another newspaper, willing to provide journalism of the
caliber to which these readers had been accustomed, to enter
the market. As a result, newspaper firms that attempted to cir-
cumvent the increased costs which the proposed wrongful dis-
charge action would attach to enforcing policy might subject
themselves to new, profit-threatening competition. 121 In light
of the unusually high profits most newspaper firms enjoy be-
cause of the relative lack of competition in their markets, it
would seem that this is not a risk they would undertake lightly.
Thus, there is good reason to believe that according newspa-
per journalists the proposed wrongful discharge action would
allow them to provide the public with a broader range of infor-
mation and viewpoints than is currently possible. Such a result
furthers important constitutional objectives as well.
117. Interview with Prof. Bagdikian, supra note 78.
118. See B. COMPAINE, supra note 44, at 58-59.
119. Cf. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 131.
120. H. R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMICS 1 (1981).
121. See R.G. LIPSEY & P.O. STEINER, supra note 47, at 344-47.
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Constitutional Authority for the Proposal
Because the suppression of news would be reduced, the pro-
posal promotes the first amendment goal that the press act as a
check on the government. Nonetheless, since its scope is lim-
ited to governmental encroachments on freedom of the press,
the first amendment could not provide the basis for such an
action.122 The United States Supreme Court has extended the
scope of first amendment protection to limit some private enti-
ties from interfering with free speech, 123 but such exceptions to
the state action requirement are rare and the court does not
seem inclined to make further exceptions. 24
The California Constitution also guarantees freedom of the
press.125 One might reason that the discharge of journalists by
California newspapers violates the state's constitutional protec-
tion of the press, yet the scope of this clause remains unclear.
The California Supreme Court has stated on a number of occa-
sions that the scope of the guarantees provided by the Califor-
nia Constitution is not limited by the state action rules
governing the guarantees provided by the federal Constitu-
tion. 26 But the court has also stated that it would be very cau-
tious in extending the scope of California's constitutional
protections beyond that of the United States Constitution. 27
In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,28 the California
Supreme Court explicitly held that the California Constitu-
tion's guarantees of freedom of expression were broader than
those accorded by the United States Constitution.129 However,
the Court was quite cautious and merely concluded that the
state constitution's guarantees extended to the users of a pri-
vate shopping center.130  The United States Supreme Court
once concluded that the first amendment also afforded such
122. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 694-96 n.15 (1978).
123. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
124. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
125. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (1983).
126. See, e.g., Robins y. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-10, 592 P.2d
341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979), 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
127. See Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 366-67, 521 P.2d 441, 450, 113
Cal. Rptr. 449, 458 (1974).
128. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
129. Id. at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
130. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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protection,'13' but the Court later reversed itself.1 3 2
Still, the California Supreme Court has stated that the state
constitution's guarantees of free speech and freedom of the
press are broader than those of the United States Constitu-
tion.'33 With respect to freedom of the press, this is clear from
the text of the California Constitution itself. Article 1, section
2(b) explicitly exempts reporters, editors and publishers from
contempt citations issued by courts, the legislature, or other
state agencies, which are based on a refusal to disclose confi-
dential information acquired in the course of gathering, analyz-
ing, or disseminating information for presentation by the news
media to the public. 34 The United States Constitution accords
no such guarantee to news personnel. 35 One court has already
concluded that
the broad scope of California's shield law and the fact that it
has now been embodied in one of the first articles of the state's
constitution 'reflect a paramount public interest in the mainte-
nance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable
of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial
matters .... 3.
It is clear that these goals are obstructed when information is
suppressed from newspapers because of the owners' private
concerns. 37 Nonetheless, the proposed wrongful discharge ac-
tion is not mandated by the California Constitution simply be-
cause it would promote constitutional objectives. Therefore,
absent further authority, the proposal can claim only a certain
plausibility as a constitutional imperative.
131. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1968).
132. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568-70 (1972).
133. Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr.
468, 472 (1975).
134. "A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association
or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, shall not be
adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative or administrative body, or any other
body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose the source of any
information procured while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper,
magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished
information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information
for communication to the public." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (1983).
135. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
136. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489, 495 (1981)
(quoting Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972)).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 54-112.
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Common Law Authority for the Proposal
Although a direct application of constitutional principles to
the proposal may be somewhat speculative, there is substantial
authority to support the conclusion that these principles are in-
directly applicable through California's common law of wrong-
ful discharge. Under this law, California employers are barred
from discharging employees for reasons contrary to public pol-
icy.' 38 Discharges designed to prevent information from reach-
ing the public through the press appear to be such improper
terminations since the purpose of the discharges is contrary to
that underlying the constitution's protection of freedom of
expression.
California first recognized a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge in violation of public policy in the case of Petermann v.
Teamsters. 139 In that case, the employee brought suit after be-
ing discharged for refusing to give false testimony to a legisla-
tive committee. 140 His employment contract, however, did not
specify the term of his employment and under California's la-
bor code, such an agreement is terminable at the will of either
party.141 Nonetheless, the Petermann court held that an em-
ployer could not use his power to terminate for the purpose of
promoting objectives which were contrary to public policy.
42
The court concluded that California's perjury statute clearly
expressed the state's policy of promoting truthful testimony
before official bodies. Therefore, the court reasoned, the dis-
charge violated public policy.
43
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,'14 the Supreme Court
affirmed the analysis of Petermann.145 The facts in Tameny
were similar to those in Petermann. The plaintiff had been or-
dered to violate a criminal price-fixing statute, refused, and as a
result, was discharged.'46 The court not only affirmed the rule
that individuals who are discharged for reasons contrary to
public policy have an action for wrongful discharge, but further
138. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332-33,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1980).
139. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
140. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 27.
141. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
142. Id. at 188-90, 344 P.2d at 27-28.
143. Id. at 188-92, 344 P.2d at 27-29.
144. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
145. Id. at 174, 610 P.2d at 1333-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
146. Id. at 171, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
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stated that the action sounds in tort as well as in contract.147
The court reasoned that such discharges are tortious because
they constitute an assault on public policy independent of any
agreement the parties might formulate.
148
However, after Tameny, it remained unclear to what extent
the courts would prohibit terminations as a violation of public
policy. For example, there is dicta in Petermann which defines
public policy broadly as "good morals or any established inter-
ests of society.' 1 49 Yet, Tameny and all previous actions that
were affirmed by appellate courts were based on statutes. That
is, the employee's discharge either had been prohibited by stat-
ute 150 or the employer had attempted to force the employee to
violate a statute.'5'
In Hentzel v. Singer, 2 Justice Grodin, then sitting on the
court of appeals, expanded the definition of public policy in
such cases to include the objective of a statute.5 3 The plaintiff
in Hentzel was discharged for complaining about excessive
smoke in the workplace which he believed constituted a health
hazard. 54 While California had an extensive statutory scheme
regulating health and safety conditions in the workplace, there
was no statute which barred an employer from firing an em-
ployee for lodging complaints with the employer about such
conditions. And, no statute obligated an employee to complain
about unhealthy working conditions. Thus, the discharge was
neither prohibited by statute nor did it represent an attempt by
the employer to force the employee to violate a statute.
The court, however, reasoned that the entire purpose behind
the elaborate regulation of conditions in the workplace was to
protect the health and safety of employees. This goal, said the
court, would be thwarted if employers were permitted to dis-
charge employees for calling attention to conditions they be-
lieved to be hazardous. 5 5 According to this analysis, the
employer violates public policy when: 1) a discharge violates a
147. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
148. Id.
149. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
150. E.g., Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr.
769 (1961).
151. E.g., Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
152. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
153. Id. at 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
154. Id. at 293, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
155. Id. at 298, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
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statute; 2) the employer attempts to cause an employee to vio-
late a statute; or 3) the discharge violates the purpose of a
statute.
The California Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in
Sanchez v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.156 The
plaintiff in Sanchez reported improper activities by her em-
ployer to a government agency. She was then harassed by the
employer until she resigned. 157 The issue was not originally
one of wrongful discharge, but of entitlement to unemploy-
ment benefits.158 Still, the court held that an employer's retali-
ation in such circumstances was illegal. 5 9 Furthermore, the
court stated that "whistle blowers," employees who report im-
proper actions committed by their employer, should be pro-
tected by the remedy of a wrongful discharge action.
1 60
However, the court explicitly declined to define the scope of
such protection in Sanchez.1 61 The logic behind protecting
whistle blowers is the same as that offered in Hentzel: the
power to discharge violates public policy when it obstructs the
implementation of a statute as well as when it contravenes the
specific letter of a statute.
This reasoning strongly supports the conclusion that public
policy is also violated when a newspaper journalist is dis-
charged for the purpose of suppressing information. Like the
United States Constitution, California's constitution protects
the press so that it can act as a check on the government by
affording the public an unrestricted flow of information.6 2
Newspapers are perhaps the most important organs of the
press in this respect.1 63 But the power of newspaper owners to
discharge editorial employees in order to suppress information
restricts the information flow from newspapers needed to ef-
fectively check the government.
16 4
Arguably, the nature of the public policy at issue here is of
even greater importance than that discussed in Hentzel and
Sanchez. In those cases the courts addressed policy objectives
156. 36 Cal. 3d 575, 685 P.2d 61, 205 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1984).
157. Id. at 579-82, 685 P.2d at 64-66, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 504-06.
158. Id. at 578, 685 P.2d at 63-64, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
159. Id. at 588, 685 P.2d at 70, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
160. Id.
161. Id., n.12.
162. See Coliseum, 89 F.R.D. at 495.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 102-21.
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expressed in statutes. Such objectives reflect legislative policy
decisions arrived at within the republican framework estab-
lished by the state and federal constitutions. However, the pro-
tection afforded to the press is a condition of that form of
government. 65 Consequently, to the extent that the discharge
of journalists obstructs this constitutional policy, it distorts the
very framework of our government. The courts have con-
cluded that an employer's discharge power may not be used to
obstruct the statutory objectives that are promoted by the ac-
tions of "whistle blowers" and other employees whose actions
promote statutory goals. Certainly the power to discharge
must also be limited when it encroaches on a constitutional ob-
jective as fundamental as the guarantee to the public of an un-
interrupted flow of information through the press.
Does the Proposal Violate the Freedom of the Press?
Although according journalists a wrongful discharge action
may further objectives implicit in the state and federal consti-
tutional guarantees of freedom of the press, it must also be con-
sistent with existing first amendment protections of the press,
such as prior restraint. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,66 the United States Supreme Court struck down a
Florida statute which accorded candidates for office the right to
respond in the columns of any newspaper which had printed
criticism of that candidate. 167 The Court acknowledged the va-
lidity of many of the criticisms of the newspaper industry, such
as lack of competition 6 and a failure to present diverse view-
points, 69 which the reply statute could help address. The
Court concluded nonetheless that the remedy of enforced ac-
cess was unacceptable for two reasons. First, the rule would
penalize newspapers for criticizing candidates for public office
and thus might limit the vigor of such criticism. 7 ° Second,
even if it could be shown that a right of reply statute would not
deter criticism or increase the costs of operating a paper, the
Court reasoned that a right of reply is unacceptable because it
allowed government to intrude into the editorial process and
165. Stewart, supra note 1, at 633.
166. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
167. Id. at 258.
168. Id. at 249-50.
169. Id. at 250.
170. Id, at 256-57.
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the content of the paper.171
The measure proposed here differs from the statute at issue
in Tornillo in a number of key respects. Most importantly, a
wrongful discharge cause of action would not provide any au-
thority to control editorial content to government, members of
the public, or other parties not affiliated with the newspaper.
Thus, it has none of the characteristics of prior restraint inher-
ent in a reply statute.1 7 2 Furthermore, it would not cause a
newspaper to be sanctioned for its editorial choices. In this
sense, the proposal is less intrusive than libel laws, which the
Court has held to be constitutional. 73
Liability under such a statute would be premised on the con-
ditions under which a newspaper discharges an editorial em-
ployee. In contrast to either right of reply statutes, which
represent unconstitutional encroachments on the press, or to
libel laws, which are constitutional encroachments on the
press, the effect of the wrongful discharge remedy would be to
enhance the vigor of a newspaper's criticism and its autonomy
from such non-journalistic influences as its owner's commercial
and ideological interests. Rather than bringing outside forces
to bear on newspapers, the proposal would merely shift some
editorial power from one sector of the institution, the owner, to
another sector, the editorial staff.
174
However, the measure does single out newspapers for special
treatment. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commission of Revenue, 175 the Supreme Court stated that any
tax which applies only to the press must satisfy an overriding
governmental purpose which cannot be achieved in a less intru-
sive fashion. 76 Applying this rule, the Court concluded that a
special newspaper tax created for the purpose of raising reve-
nue was unconstitutional, even if it may have had the effect of
providing newspapers with a lower tax rate than other busi-
nesses.1 7 7 The Court reasoned that once the press is subject to a
171. Id. at 258.
172. See Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE L. J. 361, 367 (1976). The article
concludes that by virtue of its direct intrusion into the editorial process, a reply stat-
ute, or any guaranteed access rule, carries the same strong presumption against its
constitutionality as does a prior restraint that proscribes publication.
173. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
174. See Baker, supra note 21, at 881.
175. 460 U.S. 585 (1983).
176. Id. at 588.
177. Id. at 591.
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special tax, the government is in a position to raise the tax to
levels which could severely burden the press. Even the threat
of such treatment could have a chilling effect on the press and
would provide the government with a capacity to influence the
press which is incompatible with its checking function.17 s
The wrongful discharge remedy, however, is not a tax. Fur-
thermore, in contrast to a tax, the proposal does not allow ad-
ministrative, legislative or executive organs of the government
to affect a newspaper's operating expenses. The proposal cre-
ates costs for a newspaper only as a result of decisions by the
newspaper employer, the discharged employee, and the court.
Thus, it would afford the government none of the potential lev-
erage which was the focus of the Court's concern in Minneapo-
lis Star.
A closer analogue to the proposal is the Newspaper Preserva-
tion Act.'79 The purpose of the Act is to prevent newspaper
failures as well as any further deterioration of newspaper qual-
ity caused by reductions in the already limited number of com-
petitive newspaper markets in the United States.IS2 It purports
to advance this objective by providing antitrust exemptions to
newspapers in circumstances which suggest that, absent an an-
titrust exemption, a daily newspaper would fold, diminishing
competition in that market.181 While it is not entirely clear that
the Act has actually served to prevent newspaper failures
182
and despite some evidence that it creates a special market con-
straint on smaller publications,8 3 the measure has been upheld
as a reasonable method of promoting a substantial governmen-
tal objective. 84
While the method employing the wrongful discharge propo-
s al differs from that of the Newspaper Preservation Act, its aim
is similar: to enhance the vigor of a newspaper industry which
is not adequately subject to the constraints of a competitive
market. Accordingly, its objective is a constitutionally permis-
sible one. In contrast to the Act, however, the proposal is not
178. Id. at 585.
179. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982).
180. See Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 473-74
(9th Cir. 1983).
181. See, e.g., Barnett, Monopoly Games, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June
1980, at 40.
182. See id.
183. Committee for an Independent P-I, 704 F.2d at 481.
184. Id. at 481-82.
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likely to adversely affect any element of the press. Thus, the
proposal would appear, even more than the Newspaper Preser-
vation Act, to qualify as a reasonable method of promoting a
substantial governmental objective.
185
Does the Proposal Encroach On the Owner's
Freedom of Expression?
In assessing whether the proposal encroaches on the newspa-
per owner's freedom of expression, it is first necessary to note
that the proposal does not regulate speech itself, but rather
conduct related to speech. Regulations of speech itself must be
narrowly tailored to promote a "compelling governmental in-
terest.'18 6 In contrast, laws which indirectly affect expression
by regulating action are controlled by a lesser standard. They
need only further a "substantial governmental interest," which
is unrelated to freedom of expression and whose restriction of
expression is no greater than is necessary to the furtherance of
that interest.
187
The Court's affirmance of the constitutionality of the News-
paper Preservation Act indicates that the purpose of the propo-
sal is sufficiently important to satisfy the "substantial
governmental interest" standard.188 Two Supreme Court deci-
sions, International Longshoreman's Association v. Allied In-
ternational Inc.'89 and FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting,9 ' suggest that, to the extent the proposal may
limit the expression of newspaper owners, it does so within
constitutionally permissible limits. In Allied, the Court held
that government may prohibit secondary labor boycotts even
where their objective was not to advance the interests of labor
in industrial conflict, but rather to express a political posi-
tion.' 9 ' Although protection of political expression is a major
purpose of the first amendment, 92 the Court concluded that
the law's encroachment on the employees' capacity to express
themselves, even on a political issue, was sufficiently tailored to
185. See id.
186. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
187. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
188. See Committee for an Independent P-I, 704 F.2d 481-82.
189. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
190. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
191. Allied, 456 U.S. at 222-24.
192. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
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further the substantial governmental interest in preventing
disruptions of interstate commerce.193
The proposal, however, is substantially less restrictive of
newspaper owners' speech than the secondary boycott limita-
tion is of longshormen's speech. While the boycott was itself an
expressive act, the discharge of a journalist is not. On the con-
trary, newspaper owners disavow the use of their discharge
power for the purpose of making political statements. 194 The
discharge power which the proposal would constrain is expres-
sive only in that it empowers a newspaper owner to suppress
the dissemination of news at whim. Thus, if the government
may prohibit the use of economic coercion in the context of la-
bor relations even where that restriction curtails explicitly ex-
pressive action, it seems proper to prohibit the use of economic
coercion which has only an indirect expressive objective.
An even better analogue to the proposal is the FCC regula-
tion upheld in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broad-
casting, which bars the owners of newspapers from purchasing
a broadcast outlet that serves the same market as their pa-
per. 95 The rule was challenged as an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the free speech rights of owners. 96 In rejecting
the challenge, the Court stated that the Constitution does not
afford the same right to broadcast as it does to speak and to
print. 97 Consequently, the FCC rule was found to be a legiti-
mate method of promoting a reasonable first amendment pur-
pose: encouraging a diversity of viewpoints in the mass
media.1
98
Even though it pursues similar purposes, the wrongful dis-
charge proposal is even less speech restrictive than the FCC
rule. The owner's power to vent its views in the columns of its
newspaper is undiminished by the proposal. The owner may,
under the proposed rule, fill the entirety of its newspaper with
nothing other than its own impressions and accounts of the
world. Furthermore, the owner retains the power to cut any
stories it chooses. The owner would simply be barred from dis-
charging a journalist to achieve this end. The FCC rule, in con-
193. Allied, 456 U.S. at 222-24, 226-27 n.26.
194. B. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 6, at 236-37.
195. 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978).
196. Id. at 779.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 801-02.
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trast, materially limits the capacity of a newspaper owner to
express its views in another medium.
Although the court noted in National Citizens Committee
that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to broadcast, it
does guarantee a right to print.1 99 Yet, it is not the owner's
right to print at issue here, but rather the owner's right to dis-
charge. Clearly, there can no more be a first amendment right
to discharge for self expression than there is to use other forms
of economic coercion, such as secondary boycotts, for expres-
sive purposes. 200 Therefore, the newspaper owner's first
amendment rights are unaffected by the proposed rule.
Conclusion
The press' ability to effectively check the government is seri-
ously undermined by the current structure of the newspaper
industry. Newspaper owners presently have both the ability
and inclination to limit the flow of information to the public.
As a result, newspapers have failed to provide the public with
the information it needs to evaluate a wide range of public pol-
icy questions. A consideration of the economic and social hier-
archies and interests within newspaper companies, and an
observation of past behavior, suggest that this problem would
be significantly ameliorated if newspaper owners were pre-
vented from suppressing information through the threat of
discharge.
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
first amendment suggests that no judicial remedy is provided
by the United States Constitution. The California Constitution
arguably provides the basis for a judicial remedy, but such a
claim lacks direct authority and thus is speculative. There is
substantial authority, however, to support a judicial remedy by
extending California's common law bar against discharges mo-
tivated by purposes contrary to public policy. Such an exten-
sion would afford editors and reporters an action in tort against
their employers when they are discharged for the purpose of
punishing, deterring or preventing the publication of informa-
tion in the newspaper. Like other wrongful discharge actions,
the employee would prevail only if she could prove that the
discharge was motivated by the proscribed purpose, rather than
199. Id. at 779.
200. See Allied, 456 U.S. at 222-24, 226-27 n.26.
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for legitimate reasons such as financial hardship or failure to
perform assigned tasks.
This measure does not impinge on the freedom of the press
because it neither permits the government to intervene in deci-
sions concerning the newspaper's content nor does it single out
newspapers in a fashion which leaves them open to possible
governmental coercion. The measure also respects the owner's
freedom of expression; it limits neither its speech nor its sym-
bolic action. Instead, it entails a very narrow limitation on the
owner's ability to use its employment power to prevent journal-
ists from publishing information which it prefers to suppress.
This restriction is less drastic than that imposed by federal la-
bor and communications laws already found by the United
States Supreme Court to be consistent with the constitutional
guarantee of free expression.
In summary, the wrongful discharge proposal would further
the important constitutional objective of enhancing the diver-
sity of information and viewpoints presented to the public with-
out interfering with the first amendment rights of other
individuals or of newspaper owners.
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